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I
The maintenance of the social equilibrium is accomplished by the
state through the administration of. justice.' This is the modern sub-
stitute for the primitive practice of self-help. While the dawn of
civilization reveals but crude notions of judicial institutions, one
of the first manifestations of organized society was the creation of
machinery for voluntary arbitration as an optional substitute for
private vengeance and self-help, the acknowledged methods of insuring
respect for the societal rules. But the decisions of the first judges,
who were merely arbitrators, had only a moral force; and if the
complaining litigant was dissatisfied with the award, he could still
resort to self-help. For its own protection against the resulting
anarchy and violence, organized society, having acquired the power,
took upon itself the monopoly of administering justice through estab-
lished courts. But though this evolution is one of centuries, the funda-
mental theory still prevails that the redress of wrongs is the raison
d'tre both of violent self-help and of its more civilized substitute, the
courts; and the notion of vengeance, while rejected by modern schools,
is still evident in the penalties imposed in the administration of
The complex relationships involved in the notion of justice are not here
of immediate" concern. The equilibrium is established through law, which may
be. called distributive justice; and maintained through the enforcement of' law,
which may be called corrective justice. It is in this latter aspect of justice that
our immediate interest centers. See on the general subject, Pulszky, The Theory
of Law and Civil Society (London, 1888) ch. XlI.
I [I]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
criminal justice and in their tempered and better adjusted substitute,
damages, awarded in the administration of civil justice. The com-
mission of wrong, public or private, is essential, so we are taught, in
order that the judicial arm of the State may be invoked to restore the
social equilibrium. 2  Thus Blackstone says: "The more effectually
to accomplish the redress of private injuries, courts of justice are
instituted in every civilized society." 8 This theory was fundamental in
the common law.
Yet a study of modern social and industrial conditions emphasizes
the conviction that the social equilibrium is disturbed not only by
a violation of private rights, privileges, powers and immunities
4 but
by the placing of these individual advantages in grave doubt and
uncertainty. If the status of children as legitimate or illegitimate
or of persons as married or unmarried is uncertain, not only the
individual but the State has an interest in having the uncertainty
settled by an authoritative determination. If the title to property is
uncertain, the State, as well as the individuals concerned, has an
interest in removing the uncertainty, and within certain limitations
courts of equity entertain jurisdiction to remove clouds from title.5
If the meaning of a contract is in doubt, it must be broken in order
to obtain an authoritative construction of it, with expensive litigation
to boot. Similarly, apart from the trustee's bill for advice, a hostile
attack must generally precede the adjudication of conflicting claims
under a will. To determine these questions, which are illustrations
merely, our law now requires an elaborate procedure involving delay,
uncertainty and considerable expense, when all that is desired is an
authoritative determination of a simple issue of fact or of law. Parties
'Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th ed.) sees. 26, 27. Carter, Law: Its Origin,
Growth and Function, 45 et seq.
a 3 Bl. Com. 2, 15. See also Pound, Readings on the History and System of
the Common Law (2d ed.) 305 et seq. Salmond, op. cit. 71 : "Justice is admin-
istered only against wrongdoers, in act or in intent."
"In the course of this study we shall adopt Prof. Wesley N. Hohfeld's
valuable analysis of jural relations as first set forth in (1913) 23 YALE LAw
JOuRNAL, i6. These relations may most readily be presented in Prof. Hohfeld's
scheme of opposites and correlatives:
Jural right privilege power immunity
Opposites no-right duty disability liability
Jural right privilege power immunity
Correlatives tduty no-right liability disability
The importance of this analysis is revealed throughout the subject of declara-
tory judgments. See particularly Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay (C. A.) [1p15]
2 K. B. 536, 548, Bucldey, L. J., and p. 571, Bankes, L. 3.
'As a rule, however, only Where the plaintiff is in possession. The dispute
of title to personal property cannot, except in rare instances, be settled in any
such manner. See Infra, p. 30.
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are compelled to indulge in legal hostilities whether they want to or not
in order that their legal relations may be cleared of doubt or uncer-
tainty. That the law has not been oblivious to the necessity of
certainty and security in legal relations is evidenced in the fact that
certain agreements in order to obtain judicial recognition must be
reduced to writing or must be recorded. It is also evidenced in the
employment of such equitable remedies as bills quia timet, bills of
peace and bills to remove cloud from title, bills for the rescission and
cancellation of written instruments, in the action to perpetuate testi-
mony and in the bill for injunction. While the general purpose of
these equitable remedies is to create security, remove uncertainty and
prevent litigation,6 many of the remedies are cumbersome and their
grant is dependent upon very technical conditions precedent. Take,
for example, the writ of injunction. Aside from its curative func-
tions in affording redress for certain kinds of continuing wrongs,
it has important preventive functions. One of the principal condi-
tions of its issuance, however, is the inadequacy of the remedy at law,
and as damages are deemed a sufficient palliative for most legal
injuries,--again on the theory that justice functions with entire success
if it gives money compensation after the commission of a wrong-the
injunction will be issued but rarely to restrain a breach of contract or
a trespass.7
The bill quia timet is a writ of prevention designed to avoid possible future
injury to the applicant's property and to preserve it for its appropriate uses.
This is effected by appointment of receivers or conservators to collect income,
or by a demand for security. The injunction to prevent waste, etc., is in the
nature of a bill quia timet. The bill of peace is designed to establish and per-
petuate a right or privilege which may be controverted by different persons or
at different times and is intended to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The bill
to remove cloud from title and the cancellation of outstanding instruments which
inequitably affect a person's rights or privileges are in the nature of a remedy
quia tinet. Sometimes the decree- may in such cases operate as a declaratory
decree. Infra, p. 30.
The action to perpetuate testimony, a provisional remedy well known in
Anglo-American and in the civil law, is designed to preserve and perpetuate
for future use testimony which is in danger of being lost. These equitable
remedies are fully discussed in works on equity, particularly in those of Story
and of Pomeroy. All these remedies have a limited application, and their
grant is conditioned upon the fulfillment of strict preliminary requirements;
and while courts of equity have much flexibility in adapting their relief to the
situation presented, they incidentally have wide powers in imposing upon
applicants for the exercise of their functions such conditions as they may deem
necessary to do equity in the case.
" Generally only in the case of such contracts as agreements not to carry on
a trade, contracts for personal services of exceptional character, certain cove-
nants restricting the use of land, or where some distinctly equitable ground such
as the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits can be shown to exist. Usually an
injunction against breach will be granted only where specific performance would
be decreed. Courts of equity are now somewhat more liberal in granting relief
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The limited scope of these various kinds of preventive relief against
insecurity and the disturbance of the status quo makes it all the more
necessary that we examine with care that instrument of preventive
relief known to the English and other legal systems as the declaratory
judgment. The distinctive characteristic of such a judgment is that
it carries with it no coercive decree or order commanding the defendant
or the sheriff to do anything, an inherent element of all executory
judgments. Its purpose is to afford security and relief against uncer-
tainty and doubt. It does not necessarily presuppose culpable conduct
on the part of the defendant, but it enables any party whose rights,
privileges, powers or immunities, whether evidenced by a written
instrument or not, have been disputed, endangered, threatened or
placed in uncertainty by another person to invoke the aid of a court
to obtain an authoritative determination or declaration of his rights
or other legal relations.
At the outset it will be well to circumscribe the concept of "declara-
tory judgment." In a sense all judgments of courts declare jural
relations, but most of them, being called into operation by some past
or immediately threatened violation of a right, are followed by further
relief in the form of a judgment for the payment of damages or a
decree for an injunction. These judgments require the losing defend-
ant to do something, and may be called executory, i. e., they may be
executed. They always involve rights and duties. A second class
of judgments likewise determines or establishes a jural relation; yet
they are not followed by a decree ordering the performance of some
duty but merely by a decree which effects some change of status, the
judgment thus constituting merely a source of new jural relations.
Such are, among others, judgments of divorce or of annulment of
a voidable marriage, appointments of guardians or receivers, admissions
of wills to probate, judicial declarations of death or of majority in
civil-law countries, the judicial authentication of arrangements in
which the public interest requires an official protection of private jural
relations, such as liquidations, certain changes in corporate organiza-
tion,8 the administration of trusts, etc. They may be the result of
contentious or non-contentious proceedings, although the latter are
practically administrative rather than judicial functions. These judg-
ments, because they effect a change of status and are primarily a
source of new jural relations, may be called constitutive or, as we
by injunction against trespass than were the early chancery courts, but the narrow
interpretation of "inadequacy of legal remedy" still confines the injunction to
a limited class of trespasses. See Moore v. Halliday (9o3) 43 Oreg. 243, 99
Am. St. Rep. 742, 72 Pac. 8oi and note thereto; Xenia Real Estate Co. v. Macy
(1897) 147 Ind. 568, 47 N. E. 147 with quotation from Pomeroy.
8 See In re Guardian Assurance Co. [I91] I Ch. 431. Toronto Corporation v.
Toronto Railway (P. C.) [i916] 2 A. C. 542.
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prefer to call them, "investitive."'  The judgment in either of these
two actions, which are directed to some relief, may indeed involve
solely the determination of a status, e. g., that the petitioner who seeks
an order authorizing his inscription as an adopted child,10 or that the
decedent whose will is to be probated, is or was a citizen.' But these
judgments are, nevertheless, not strictly declaratory. We would con-
fine that term to those judgments which merely declare the existence
of a jural relation, i. e., some right, privilege, power or immunity in
the plaintiff or some duty, no-right, liability or disability in the defend-
ant. They do not presuppose a wrong already done, a breach of duty.
They cannot be executed, as they order nothing to be done. They do
not constitute operative facts creating new legal relations of a sec-
ondary or remedial character; they purport merely to declare pre-
existing relations and create no secondary or remedial ones.' 2 Their
distinctive characteristic lies in the fact that they constitute merely an
authentic confirmation of already existing relations.
While the purpose of the declaratory judgment, as Bailhache, J.,
remarked in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay,1 3 is not to enable people
to "sleep o'nights," such a judgment will be rendered in the exercise
of the court's discretion when it will serve some practical purpose;
for'example, when it will guide parties to a contract as to their future
conduct under it, and "with a view rather to avoid litigation than in
aid of it." Aside from its employment in cases in which the pre-
ventive equitable remedies above mentioned are inapplicable, thus
This Benthamism, whose use may be pardoned, seems more descriptive than
the term "titles of right" employed by Salmond, op. cit. 91. The term "right"
here is too uncertain in connotation. The Germans call these judgments "con-
stitutive." Perhaps a more accurate nomenclature might use the term "dives-
titive" for those judgments, like the annulment of a voidable marriage or
dissolution of partnership, which merely terminate an existing status. See
Elemer Balog, Ueber das konstitutive Urteil (1907) 34 ZEITSCHRsn FOR DAS PRIVAT
UN! 6MFENTLICHE RECHT DER GEGENWART, 123-168; also E. H61der, Ueber das
Klagrecht (i9o4) 46 Jhering's JAHRBf0cHER, 282, 306 and Prof. Hellman, Klag-
recht, Feststellungsklage und Anspruch (1892) 31 ibid., 9o, 114; also Hellwig,
System des deutschen Zivilprozessrechts (Leipzig, 1912) 287.
'0In re Hollaender and Donnet (Sept. 8, 1916, Court of Rouen) reported in
(1917) 44 CLUNET, 1009.
UIn re Lee's Will (Mar. 3o, 1918, U. S. Court for China) (1918) 27 YAIE
LAW JoURNAL, 1O82.
"Strictly speaking, judgments dismissing a complaint are declaratory in their
nature, but they differ in principle from those now under consideration in that
some coercive relief was asked for. An exhaustive theoretical discussion of the
distinction between the declaratory judgment and the executory-also called
dispositive or condemnatory-judgment is to be found in F. F. Heim, Die Fest-
stellungswirkung des Zivilurteils (Munich, 1912) particularly pp. 45-50, 70-75.
This monograph constitutes part i of v. 25 of the Abhandlungen sumri Privat-
recht und Zivilprozess, edited by Prof. Otto Fischer.
" (K B.) 113 L. T. 98, 1o1.
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giving relief in a new class of cases, it has by its simplicity and effec-
tiveness served largely to replace those equitable remedies where they
were formerly employed; and furthermore, appreciation in practice
of the fact that an amicable remedy is often more desirable than and
fully as useful as a non-amicable means of adjusting disputes, has
persuaded litigants frequently to employ the declaratory action instead
of the coercive executory action. Professor Sunderland in an able
article on the English declaratory judgment 4 has pointed out that
the more highly organized a society is, the less it is called upon to
display its power in order to insure obedience for its decrees. The
latent power of enforcement, universally realized, makes its exercise
generally unnecessary. As Salmond has expressed it:
"To a large extent already, in all orderly societies, this ele-
ment in the administration of justice has become merely latent;
it is now for the most part sufficient for the state to declare the
rights and duties of its subjects, without going beyond
declaration to enforcement."' 51
Even in the international field, less perfectly ordered and least stable
among the strata of organized society, only four cases are known
among the thousands of awards of arbitral commissions in which there
has been a refusal to submit to the award.
16 Here, the arbitrators
having no power to enforce their decision, the constraint of public
opinion alone compelled obedience. A fortiori, therefore, when the
State possesses full power to enforce its decrees, legislative as well
as judicial, the inclusion of a special command with each decree seems
unnecessary. The mere authoritative declaration of the reciprocal
rights and obligations of the parties suffices to insure obedience; but
should a losing party charged with duties actually prove recalcitrant,
it is very simple, in view of the fact that the declaratory judgment is
res adjudicata, to obtain an ordinary judgment upon which a writ
of execution may issue.
Up to the present time, with the exception of that class of judgments
which we may call purely "investitive," such as decrees of divorce,
discharges in bankruptcy, appointments of receivers, etc., which do
not operate as remedies for wrongs, but merely as creators of new
jural relations, our actions and the resulting judgments are directed to
immediate coercive relief from the court, either by way of damages,
injunction or some other command or decree. The very form of the
"
4A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-the Declaratory Judgment (1917)
16 MIcH. L. REv. 69. This is the only monographic study on the subject in the
English language known to the writer, with the exception of a brief article on
the Scotch action of declarator in (1849) 41 LAW MAGAZINE 173.
' Salmond, op. cit. 66.
"'Three of these were based upon an alleged departure by the arbitrator from
the terms of the compromis.
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demand by the plaintiff indicates a recalcitrant or culpable defendant
and the scene is set for legal war. As Professor Sunderland has
pointed out, the declaratory action, in cases where the plaintiff does
not demand coercive relief, leads to the same effective result as the
hostile action for damages or an injunction, with much simplified pro-
cedure and under the assumption, justified in most cases between
responsible litigants, that both parties wish to do right and act honestly.
The issue is framed for the answer of the court in a stated question,
for example, "whether the assignment by F. T. B. . . was void
as against his trustee in bankruptcy"' or the plaintiff claims a declara-
tion "that the defendants . . in respect of the lands in question
were not entitled to exercise the power of entry, etc. ;'1 and the facts
being before the court, in contradistinction to the procedure on
demurrer, the specific issue of law is answered usually by a simple
"yes" or "no" or by a mere grant or refusal of the declaration
requested. The request for a declaration is very frequently accom-
panied in a separate prayer by a demand for coercive relief in the
form of injunction or other decree, the advantage being that even
though the -injunction may be refused, the declaration of the legal
relations of the parties may still be made and the parties will govern
themselves accordingly.19 This usually serves the plaintiff's purpose
and renders further assistance from the courts unnecessary.
The close analogy between the declaratory judgment and arbitra-
tion will already have become apparent. In countries authorizing the
declaratory judgment, the law now furnishes parties with official
"In re Bulteel's Settlements [1917] 1 Ch. 25r, 255.
"Taff Vale Railway v. Cardiff Railway (C. A.) [1917] 1 Ch. 299, 302. Even
before the enactment of 15 & 16 Vict. ch. 5o, sec. 86 (1852) which is generally
regarded as the first legislative authorization of the declaratory judgment,
Parliament had enacted in i85o an Act, 13 & 14 Vict. ch. 35, sec. i, "to diminish
the delay and expense of proceedings in the High Court of Chancery in Eng-
land," reading in part as follows:
"That it shall be lawful for Persons interested or claiming to be interestedin any Question cognizable in the said Court as to the Construction of any Act
of Parliament, Will, Deed, or other Instrument in Writing, or any Article,Clause, Matter, or Thing therein contained, or as to the Title or Evidence ofTitle to any Real or Personal Estate contracted to be sold or otherwise dealt
with, or as to the Parties to or the Form of any Deed or Instrument for
carrying any such Contract into effect, or as to any other Matter falling within
the original Jurisdiction of the said Court as a Court of Equity, or made subject
to the Jurisdiction or Authority of the said Court by any Statute not being One
of the Statutes relating to Bankrupts, and including among such Persons allLunatics, married Women, and Infants, in the Manner and under the Restric-
tions herein-after contained, to concur in stating such Question in the form of
a Special Case for the Opinion of the said Court, and it shall also be lawful
for all Executors, Administrators, and Trustees to concur in such Case."
"See, for example, London Assn. of Shipowners etc. v. London & India
Docks, etc. (C. A.) [18921 3 Ch. 242, where the claim for injunction was aban-
doned; Llandudno Urban Council v. Woods [1899] 2 Ch. 705, where an injunc-
tion-was refused.
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"arbitrators" whose function it is to declare the legal relations exist-
ing between the parties and the law endows their decision with binding
force. The strongest attestation of the efficacy of this procedure is
the increasing frequency with which it has been resorted to in the
English courts. Of the official reports of cases in the Chancery Divi-
sion in 1884, 34 per cent were declaratory actions; in 1916, based upon
the cases reported in 2 Chancery Division this percentage had risen
to 67 per cent and in 1917 it reached 66 per cent. There is every
probability that recourse to the declaratory action will continue to
increase. The great merits of the procedure, as evidenced by its con-
stant employment in England, Scotland, Ireland, India, Ontario,
British Columbia, and other Canadian provinces, in Australia, New
Zealand and several of the Australian states, and in Germany and
Austria commend it to the American legal system as a reform worthy
of adoption.
Before entering upon an account of the historical development of
this important institution and an analysis of the various classes of
cases in which it has been employed, it seems desirable to call atten-
tion to the fact that the declaration may be requested by the plaintiff
and made by the court either in the affirmative or in the negative form.
While all jural relations necessarily involve their correlatives and their
corresponding opposites in the other party, the affirmative form of
declaration is apparently generally employed where the plaintiff asserts
his own right or power or the defendant's duty or liability. For
example, A asks a declaration of his right of way over B's land or
of his power to assign a certain lease without the landlord's consent;
or he may ask a declaration that B is indebted to him for a year's rent
or that B is responsible for the debts that may be contracted by his
wife. The affirmative form of declaration is usual when the plaintiff's
cause of action is one in which he might have been able to obtain
coercive relief but is satisfied with a declaratory judgment.
The second or negative form of declaration affords in certain cases
a novel kind of relief, to be explained presently. It is usually under
the form of a negative declaration that the plaintiff asserts his privi-
lege or immunity or the defendant's no-right or disability (no power) .20
For example, B may ask a declaration that he is not obliged to return
to A a sum of money previously paid to B (privilege) ; or that he is
not subject, as a non-resident, to the payment of certain taxes
(immunity) ;. or, he may claim a declaration that A has "no-right"
to walk over his land;- or, being himself a remainderman, he may ask
a declaration that the defendant, a life tenant, has no power, (i. e. is
under a disability) to convey the fee simple. In some of these cases,
notably in the first two, the plaintiff has no cause of action, yet by
*'See Prof. Hohfeld's scheme of jural opposites and correlatives, supra,
note 4.
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reason of the declaratory procedure he is enabled as "equitable"
plaintiff (prospective legal defendant) to bring the defendant into
court and to compel him to prove his claim or be barred from asserting
it thereafter against the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserts his privilege
or freedom from the claim of the defendant. This valuable form of
relief by way of negative declaration of privilege has been consciously
admitted in England only since 1915, when the important case of
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay2' was decided by the Court of Appeal,
two judges deciding in favor of the negative declaration and one
against it.2 2  In that case, certain bills of exchange supported by
certain forged bills of lading purporting to represent cotton were
purchased by the Guaranty Trust Co. of New York. They were
accepted in England by Hannay & Co. and paid. It was then dis-
covered that the bills of lading were forged and did not represent
goods actually shipped. Hannay & Co. brought an action in the fed-
eral District Court in New York to recover the money they had paid
the Guaranty Trust Co., alleging that the bills of exchange were non-
negotiable and conditional upon the actual existence of cotton.23 The
federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that the decision depended upon
English law, whereupon the Guaranty Trust Co. brought an action in
England for "a declaration that the plaintiffs are not liable to repay
to the defendants any sums paid by them" in respect of these bills of
exchange. The defendants denied the jurisdiction of the court to
make such a declaration, inasmuch as the plaintiffs had no "cause of
action"; and certain English. courts24 had indeed considered this a
condition precedent to a "declaration of right" as it is called by the
English Order XXV, rule 5, of the Rules of 1883 of the Supreme
Court. That rule reads:
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought
thereby, and the Court may make binding declarations of right
whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not."
Bulkley, L. J., held that the cause of action here being in the def end-
ant and not in the plaintiff, no declaration could be made. 25 Pickford,
(C. A.) [19151 536.
SThe term negative declaration is not used in England, although it is in
Germany. This particular form of declaration has been used in Scotland for
300 years and on the continent of Europe probably longer. Its history will be
set forth presently.
(I911) 187 Fed. 686; (r913) 21o Fed. 81o. For a Comment on this case, see
(18) 27 YArE LAW JOuRNAL, 3046.
"
4Brooking v. Maudsley, Son & Field (1888) 38 Ch. D. 636, 646; Williams v.
North's Navigation Collieries [19o4] 2 K. B. 44, 49; North Eastern Marine
Engineering Co. v. Leeds Forge Co. [i9o6] i Ch. 324; (C. A.) [1906] 2 Ch. 498;
Offin v. Rochford Rural Council [i9o6] i Ch. 342.
2[i915] 2 K. B. 548.
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L. J., relying principally on two earlier cases28 in which the question
had not been specially raised, and not wishing to narrow the court's
power, held, while considering the exercise of the power very excep-
tional, that the court had jurisdiction to make the declaration asked.
2
T
Bankes, L. J., believed that while a cause of action was necessary in
view of the phrase "declaration of right," whereas plaintiffs asked
a declaration of their freedom from a duty (i. e., a privilege), still the
first part of the rule which speaks of "declaratory judgment or.order"
gave the court power to make a declaratory order, without limiting
it to a declaration of "right" and the second part of the rule con-
templates a person seeking "relief," which is not confined to relief
in respect of a cause of action.28  While this may be dictum, the
opinion constitutes a most exhaustive discussion of this phase of the
declaratory action; and while the grounds of the decision are not
entirely satisfactory-for two of the three judges seemed to think
that the plaintiff ought to have an affirmative cause of action-
subsequent decisions during the last two years have placed it beyond
doubt that the negative form of declaration is within the jurisdiction
of the court .2 a It is interesting to observe that the term declaration
of "right"--which was probably not meant in the narrow yet tech-
nically correct sense in which Bankes, L. J., interpreted it, namely, as
excluding privilege, power or immunity-is in the German code of
civil procedure of 1877 converted into the term declaration of "legal
relations," and in the Specific Relief Act of India of the same year,
though called a declaration of "right," is by the authoritative illus-
trations which accompany the statute applied not only to rights but
to other jural relations as well.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
(a) ROMAN LAW
The affirmative declaratory judgment finds its origin in the Roman
law. In the Roman law of procedure, as in our own, the action at law
led to an executory judgment, condemnatio.29  But it often proved
necessary to decide in a preliminary way certain questions of law or
'London Assn. of Shipomners etc. v. London & India Docks etc. (C. A.)
[1892] 3 Ch. 242; Dyson v. Attorney-General (C. A.) [1912] 1 Ch. i58.
[1915] 2 K. B. 565.
SIbid. 574.
'aInfra, notes 307 et seq.
"' In this word condernnatio, which was a civil executory judgment command-
ing that something be done, e.g., that damages be paid, the underlying theory
that judicial relief involves the redress of wrongdoing becomes clear. Only
proceedings which led to 1a condemnatio were called actions in the classical
Roman law; with the exception of "investitive" judgments, e.g., judgments of
divorce, the appointment of receivers, etc., this still appears to represent the
conception of actions in our law.
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of fact which the parties themselves, by agreement, or the magistrate
or praetor, at the request of one of the parties, might submit to the
judex for decision. This decision was merely a declaration of the judex
in response to the question submitted. Instead of commanding the
performance of some act, his decision constituted merely the affirma-
tion of an existing state of facts or of law. Being merely incidental
or preliminary to an ordinary executory action, it was known as a
prae-judicium. It ended in a pronuntiatio, not in a condemnatio. In
the period of the legis actiones this pronuntiatio was obtained by means
of the sponsio, so far as the question was not taken up in the legis
actio itself. In the formulary procedure the form of submission was
greatly simplified. In the intentio the formula stated the specific ques-
tion of law or fact which had to be determined; it was much like the
regular formula for the trial of an action, except that the condemnatio
was omitted.
This procedure proved so useful that it was ultimately extended to
independent actions where no executory judgment (condemnatio) was
required or desired. The actions then received the name actiones
praejudiciales, the dignity of actiones having theretofore been denied
them.30 In application they were limited to certain classes of cases,
principally questions of status and of certain property rights and rela-
tions incidental to status, such as the amount of a wife's dowry which
had to be returned to her on the termination of the marriage, and, less.
frequently, questions of the validity of legal instruments. These
actions, which were personal actions in rem, are grouped by Wind-
scheid as including questions of status libertatis, civitatis, familiae.
The questions, among others, more frequently submitted to determina-
tion related to the status of and property in slaves; declarations of
liberty; questions of the power of the master, and of the father over
his children; questions of legitimacy and of family relationship; the
validity or invalidity of a will (querela inofficiosi testamenti)31 and of
other legal instruments.3 2
,' Some authorities assert that they are still merely interlocutory judgments;
but while of course it was always possible to follow them with an executory
action, this was so frequently not done that their independent status came to be
recognized. Gaius is our principal source of knowledge on the subject of the
actiones praejudiciales.
See i Bekker, Die Aktionen des r~mischen Prvatrechts (Berlin, 1871) ch.
14, p. 272 et seq. The form of the action really makes this an action for a
declaration of the invalidity of a will.
' A vast amount of learning in the literature of the Roman law has been
devoted to the elucidation of the actiones praejudiciales. Of that examined, the
following may be recommended as the most useful. 4 Gaius (Poste's 3d ed.)
sec. 44; 1 Bekker, op. cit. 283 et seq.; 2 Bethmann-Hollweg, Der r~mische
Civilprozess (Bonn, 1865) sec. 97; Windscheid, Lelrbuch des Pandektenrechts(5th ed.) sec. 45, pp. 111-112; sec. 122, pp. 36o-361; Baron, Pandekten (9th ed.)
sec. 8o, p. 161; and a valuable monograph by Degenkolb, Einlassungszwang und
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It is interesting to observe that in the development of the declaratory
judgment during the Middle Ages and after the "reception" of Roman
law in continental Europe in 1495, questions of status, of property
rights connected therewith, and of the validity or invalidity of wills
and other legal instruments, constitute the principal subjects of
declaratory actions. At the present time, however, instead of being
confined to a limited number of subjects with individual forms, the
declaratory action is almost unlimited as to subjects and has a general
form sufficiently wide to accommodate any specific questions.
That the declaratory action is in effect an action for the security
and protection of existing rights, privileges, powers or immunities
is made evident by tracing the history and purpose of the negative
form of declaratory judgment. By this action the plaintiff asks a
declaration that the defendant has no right as opposed to the plaintiff's
privilege, i. e., that the plaintiff is under no duty to the defendant, or
that the plaintiff is under an immunity from any power of or control
by (i. e., there is a disability of) the defendant. The danger of uncer-
.tainty and insecurity of rights and other jural relations against which
the declaratory action was designed to guard was threatened in one
of two ways-either by the defendant's denial of well-established and
well-founded rights or other legal relations, or by the defendant's
assertion of unfounded claims. It was to meet the second class of
danger that the negative declaratory action was invented. The classical
Roman law hardly knew this remedy at all, except with respect to the
actio negatoria utilis, to protect a possessor or pledgee against claims
conflicting with the exercise of his rights, etc., in property. In the
Code of Justinian38 the first mention is to be found of the so-called
Urteilsnorin (Leipzig, 1877), 96, 131, 146-168, 187 et seq. Degenkolb, p. i88,
points out certain remedies of the Roman law which are in the nature of
declaratory actions, all of which are directed to the security of the plaintiff,
e.g., the interrogationes in jure, the action arising out of non-delivery of a
receipt, the demand for a bond (cautio), and the liberationis condictio, or release
from a possibly existing obligation (but not the establishment of a non debet).
Some writers place in a separate category the summary action on bills of
exchange and other commercial documents which carry with them, after formal
acknowledgment or admission of the signature of the party charged, a right
to the immediate issuance of a writ of execution. The party charged must then
give bond to stay the execution. This procedure is known to most of the civil
law countries, which endow commercial contracts with a special sanctity and.
protection. See Borchard, Guide to the Law and Legal Literature of Argen-
tina, Brazil and Chile (Washington, 1917) 95, 408. The procedure for securing.
the debtor's acknowledgment of his signature has some resemblance t6 the
declaratory action. It is aimed primarily at recognition or admission by the
party defendant rather than at declaration by the judge, although this is its
subsidiary purpose, should the defendant refuse his recognition. See Leonhard,
De natura actionis quae praeudicialis vocatur (Leipzig, 1874) 17 et seq.
Code, 7, 14, 5. A translation of the passage is to be found in DeVillier's
edition of Voet's Commentary on the Pandects (Cape Town, igoo) Book XLVII,
Tit. IO, p. 143.
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Lex Diffantari, embodying a rescript of one of the emperors to a
certain Cresceus whose status some one had disparaged by asserting
that he was not free-born. The passage authorized the person slan-
dered to cite the adverse party, and if the latter failed to prove his
assertion he was to be ordered to keep silent. Primarily this involved
both a declaration of privilege and of a right, followed by an executory
injunction.
The real development of this form of relief by action is to be found
in the Roman civil law of the Middle Ages, notably in Italy. Among
the several forms of protection against the assertion of unfotinded
claims which grew up at that period, four received extended applica-
tion: (i) the provocatio ex lege diffamari, which affords the broadest
foundation for the modem negative declaratory action, and the
provocatio ad agendum ex lege si contendat, 4 (2) the so-called querela
nullitatis,35 upon which the modern civil-law actions declaring the
nullity of legal transactions is founded ;36 (3) the so-called liberationis
condictio; and (4) the actio negatoria utilis.37 There were of course
certain additional remedies to assure protection against unfounded
claims, but these were usually incidental to some coercive relief which
was prayed. These are the protection of possession against the turbatio
verbis through the assertion of false claims, and the flexible imploratio
judicis for the determination of privilege or non-liability, i. e.,
immunity.38
This variety of measures for the protection of security would indi-
cate that society during the Middle Ages was more sensitive than
were the Romans to the social and individual danger of insecurity
arising out of uncertainty of legal relations. This is traceable in two
"
4By this proceeding the surety could require the creditor to bring his action
against the principal debtor, under penalty of discharging the surety from all
further liability. Baron, op. cit. 480. Similar relief may be obtained by our
bill quia titnet by which the surety can require the debtor to discharge the
debt or the creditor to sue the debtor. Hayes v. Ward (i8ig, N. Y.) 4 Johns.
Ch. 123, 131; Wright v. Simpson (18o2) 6 Ves. 734.
'Baron, op. cit. 124; Windscheid, op. cit. 223, note 6.
'Probably most legal systems provide for a judicial declaration that a void
act is void; this is the purpose of the French action en nulliti and of the
German Nichtigkeitsklage. The Anglo-American law has inherited from the
civil law a somewhat similar procedure in the case of marriage void ab initio.
But beyond this, in our law, such a declaration would only be incidental to an
action for some further relief, such as setting aside or ordering the destruction
or delivery up of a void instrument; and many courts refuse such relief in the
case of an instrument void on its face on the ground that its admitted invalidity
is without further relief a sufficient protection against unfounded claims based
upon it. Such a decision would in effect be a declaratory judgment. So also,
a decision declaring the unconstitutionality of a statute.
'For the protection of privileges and immunities with respect to property.
The privileges would, of course disclose the additional presence of rights, in
case of an active attempt to interfere with the exercise of the privileges.
' Degenkolb, op. Cit. 203, 204.
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well-known legal phenomena of that period: the conceptions (a) that
it was a personal injury in the nature of slander to have an unfounded
action brought against one; and (b) that society had an interest in
the protection of the status quo. While an action is a method of
restoring a disturbed legal equilibrium and therefore an aid to ordered
community life, it nevertheless constitutes a disturbance of the peace
of the person threatened with it. For him it is a vacillation between
war and peace. Owing to this dual conception, and to the theory that
by awaiting'a time unfavorable to the defendant for bringing suit the
plaintiff was in fact abusing his privilege of resorting to the courts-
a kind of slander by way of action-the procedure was invented of
enabling the prospective defendant to appear as plaintiff with the
power to compel his opponent to come forward with his claim, prove
it, or ever after remain silent (poena perpetui silentii). In this
provocatio ex lege diffamari lies the origin of the negative declaratory
action. Confined at first to a remedy against the untimely institution
of a suit against the plaintiff, it soon developed into a remedy against
the institution of an unmeritorious or unfounded suit, by compelling
the defendant to bring his threatened claim to action at once or be
thereafter barred from asserting it.39 Against the assertion of an
unfounded money demand, the provocatio diffamari was aided by the
liberationis condictio and the imploratio judicis for the declaration of
plaintiff's freedom from duty or liability.40 It may again be noted that
.these remedies are independent of any tortious conduct on the part
of the person against whom they are directed.
Just as the provocatio ex lege diffamari was extended to substantive
claims of all kinds, so the provocatio ex lege si contendat was extended
beyond the surety's action to protect himself from liability to other
actions in which the plaintiff alleged that a defense now available to
him might be lost by the defendant's delay in instituting against him
an action to which he had a valid defense. Both proceedings, which
tended to become interchangeable, looked to the assertion of the
plaintiff's privilege as against unfounded claims of the defendant.
(b) mODERN LAW
After the "reception" of the Roman law in central Europe both
forms of declaratory action, the positive and the negative, were recog-
nized, and down to the end of the nineteenth century the codes of
civil procedure of numerous states provided for the praejudiciales
' The general provocatio was a proceeding in the nature of a suit to quiet
title directing all persons adverse to come forward with their claims or be
barred. Degenkolb, op. cit. 207. There is, of course, a close relation between
this development of the provocatio diffamnari and the slander of title, against
which the old Roman law had provided a remedy. But this required more than
the threat of an action.
'By way of the querela nullitatis.
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actions and for the provocatios. In western Europe they do not appear
to have acquired great vogue, although the canon law gave vitality
to the provocatio ex lege diffanari (the negative form of declaration)
in reference to questions of status and particularly to one of its
important forms, the jactitation proceeding, as applied especially to
marriage.
France. That the early French law was familiar with declaratory
actions is shown by Merlin, who in his Ripertoire universel
de jurisprudence defines a "d6claration" as "l'action de d~clarer, defaire connaitre," and mention is made of the declaration of a mort-
gage and of legitimacy. Jactitation proceedings were given wide appli-
cation to various branches of the law in France up to the enactment
of the code of civil procedure in 18o7, when this form of proceeding
failed of mention. Nevertheless, for some years thereafter and down
to comparatively modem times, the French law reports occasionally
disclose a case in which the plaintiff asks the court to declare that
the plaintiff has a right or power or that the defendant who has
threatened him with an action or adverse claim has no right against
him.4 1 Merlin states that the civil code has not abrogated the diffanari
law.4 2  The modem commentators, howeverO and several recent
decisions44 take the position that the diffamari procedure or action dejactance ou provocatoire is no longer admitted in French law, possibly
because of a general aversion of the French law to a determination
of interests in futuro. They give wide application to the action
for the perpetuation of testimony, which serves to prepare for a
future action for coercive relief; and slander in all its forms-of
reputation, of credit or of title-formerly a frequent subject, of declara-
tory action, is more easily the subject of a successful action for
damages than it is with us. One of the familiar kinds of declaratory
action in the French code is the proceeding for the authentication of
written instruments, by which the court is asked to declare whether
the instrument is genuine or spurious.4 This procedure was taken
over by the German code of civil procedure of 1877 ;46 but it goes little
beyond ascertaining whether the document is genuine or forged, and
serves principally as an authentic means of proof. The declaration is,
however, res judicata, and thus differs from the proceeding to per-
petuate testimony. The French law recognizes the function of the
' See under the heading "Action en justice" in I Fuzier-Herman, Repertoire
Giniral Alphabetique du Droit Frangais, 304-305, the cases mentioned in secs.
103, io6, lO7, III, 113.
R6pertoire, s. V ° Diffainari.
See I Glasson, Pricis de procedure civil (2d ed.) 227, =8.
"Cosnac v. Choppin d'Arnouville (1888) Dalloz, .urisp. Gin. 417 and note
thereto; Longuety v. Socifti des ciments (1898) Dalloz, Jurisp. Gin. 42o.
Glasson, op. cit. 511.
"See. 231; sec. 256 of the amended code of 1898.
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courts to pronounce the nullity of acts or transactions made void by
the substantive law. By statute they have recently authorized the
investigation of paternity by an illegitimate child; and this results in
a declaratory judgment of paternity.
With this, the catalogue of declaratory judgments of the modern
French law may be said to be exhausted. France has no general
statute authorizing a declaratory judgment. But while the institution
has fallen into disuse in modern France, it was from the France of
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with contributions from eccle-
siastical law, that it found its way into Scotland, where it has devel-
oped and flourished and whence, in 1852, it worked its way into
English practice. Before taking up the Scotch development, however,
the law in certain other countries will be mentioned.
Germany. The German code of civil procedure of 1877, following
the practice of various German states, adopted the declaratory judg-
ment, both affirmative and negative, in its widest application. Section
231 of that code (256 of the revised code of 1898) reads as follows:
"An action may be brought for the declaration of the existence
or non-existence of a legal relation (Rechtsverhiiltnis) or for
the declaration of the genuineness or spuriousness of a legal
instrument, provided the plaintiff has a legal interest in having
the legal relation or the genuineness or spuriousness of the
instrument determined by a judicial decision." 47
In addition the code provides in sections 633, 638 and 64o for a judicial
declaration of the existence or non-existence of a marriage or of the
relation of parent and child or of paternal power of the one over the
other.
There are in addition certain special laws which authorize a declara-
tory judgment in particular cases, e. g., the determination of the rela-
tionship of dependents to a deceased person under various accident
insurance laws ;48 the determination of the rank of conflicting creditors
under the bankruptcy act; and such miscellaneous cases as those
concerning conflicts of patent, trademark and design privileges, and
4i Gaupp-Stein, Kommentar zur Civilprozessordnung (ioth ed.) 578; vol. 2,
618; Seuffert, Kommentar zur Civilprozessordnung (7th ed.) 307 et seq.; I
Petersen, Die Civilprozessordnung (5th ed.) 492 et seq.; i Hellwig, System des
deutschen Zivilprozessrechts (Leipzig, 1912) 280 et seq.; Wach, Handbuch des
Zivilprozessrechts (Berlin, 1885) 13, 52.
The Austrian code of 1895 contains in section 28 the same provision except
that after the words "legal relation" that code interpolates the words "or
rights." See Fiirstl, Die dsterreichische Civilprozessgesetze, mit Erlduterungen
(Wien, 1898) 353; Neumann, Commentar zu den Civilprozessgesetzen vons r.
August, 1895 (Wien, 1898) 535 et seq.
' Industrial Accident Insurance Law, sec. 77; Agricultural Acc. Ins. Law,
sec. 83; Building Acc. Ins. Law, sec. 18; Marine Acc. Ins. Law, sec. 81.
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the determination by a court of what is equitable under various
circumstances when the parties fail to agree.49
The German code also makes provision in section 280 for the inter-
locutory declaratory decree as follows:
"Until the conclusion of the verbal proceedings leading to a
final judgment, the plaintiff, by widening the complaint, or the
defendant by instituting a counterclaim, may ask that a legal
relation which in the course of the proceedings became the sub-
ject of dispute and upon whose existence or non-existence the
decision of the case depends in whole or in part shall be deter-
mined judicially."
Practically an identical section (236) is incorporated in the Austrian
code of 1895.
It will be observed that section 256 provides for both the affirmative
and the negative declaratory judgment. The term "legal relation"
which is the subject of declaration is-used in the Savignyan sense of
"the relation determined by law of one person to another person or
group or to things."50  The relation may be personal, with or without
reference to property, e. g, a question of family status or membership
in a club ;51 or real, e. g., A's right to an easement over B's land.52
It extends to all jural relations, whether rights, privileges, powers or
immunities."2 The relation need not be a direct one, e. g., between
creditor and debtor; thus, it has been held that two creditors of the
same debtor have the necessary "legal relation" to determine their
respective claims to a given fund of the debtor; or a creditor and a
third person (partnership), for the creditor to obtain a declaration
against the partnership of his debtor's interest in the partnership.5 4
It will be noted that the subject of a declaration in Germany is a
"legal relation" which, while primarily intended to embrace only the
legal bond or association under examination, e. g., debtor and creditor,
must necessarily involve the jural relations composing the bond or
*These miscellaneous cases are fully set out in the commentaries mentioned
supra, note 47.W I Savigny, System, 6 et seq.; Windscheid, op. cit. sec. 37. It seems prefer-
able to substitute for the word "relation," in its present Savignyan connotation
of vinculum juris, the word "association" or "bond" and to confine legal
relations to relations between persons, although the relations may arise out of
or with respect to things.
" (1882) 8 R G, 3; (1884) 14 R G, go. R G is the abbreviation for Reichs-
gericht, the German Supreme Court at Leipzig. The names of the parties are
omitted from the official reports of German decisions.
Petersen, op. cit. 499.
German Civil Code, sec. 194, 2o9. Gaupp-Stein, op. cit. 6o7.
5, (189o) 27 R G. 345; Gaupp-Stein, op. cit. 6o8; or that a certain right is
or is not vested in a third person; or that the defendant has or has not a
right against a third person. (I898) 41 R G, 345. See also Biihr, Entscheidungen
dei Reichsgerichts, mit Besprechungen (Miinchen, 1883) i6o.
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association as a right, privilege, power, immunity, etc.; whereas the
English rule of the Supreme Court under which declaratory judgments
are rendered authorizes, under a literal interpretation, only a declara-
tion of "right." The term "right," as we have already observed,
was undoubtedly used in that broad and juristically inaccurate sense
which includes not only a right, but also other jural relations such as
privilege, power or immunity and their jural correlatives.55
The "legal interest" on the part of the plaintiff which is required
as a condition precedent to the making of a declaration may in general
terms be described as such an interest as is to be found in the danger of
loss or of uncertainty of his rights or other jural relations by a failure
of the court to make the declaration. Before the danger has accrued-
and the existence of this condition is for the court to determine-the
plaintiff's "interest" in the declaration is considered insufficient; in
other words, the action is either unfounded or premature. Thus, you
cannot have a declaration of your right or privilege against a person
who doesn't dispute it, a principle common to all legal systems; a
prospective heir cannot during the lifetime of a testator sue for a
declaration of the validity or invalidity of the will.58 The German
courts likewise assert a lack of "interest" in the declaration if the
legal right to be established -is already ascertainable in some other
form ;57 a conclusion which the English courts also reach when a
special proceeding has been provided by statute for the determination
of the particular jural relations in question.58 On the other hand, a
sufficient "interest" is to be found in the dispute of the plaintiff's
rights, etc., by one in a position to endanger them should his claims
be upheld; even the dispute of present or existing rights, etc., though
their njoyment is to be postponed to the future, dependent on the
happening of a condition or the mere lapse of time, 9 will support a
declaration. So, in England, the fact that a steamship company might
some time wish to use certain docks adjoining those then in use by
"Supra; p. IO.
Thus, the interest is lacking when the dispute of the plaintiff's rights or
an assertion of a conflicting claim emanates from a person whose conduct can
have no practical bearing on the legal position of the plaintiff. (1889) 24
R G, 405. (igoi) 49 R G, 372. Gaupp-Stein, op. cit. 6og. So a partner before
the termination of the liquidation proceedings cannot sue for a declaration of
disputed claims; nor can a registered association sue dropped or resigned mem-
bers for the declaration of a possible liability to share in taxes. (1882) 8
R G, 72, 74; Petersen, op. cit. 505. See to the same effect the Scotch deci-
sions, infra, note 155.
' Gaupp-Stein, op. cit. 612, 613 and cases there cited in notes go-92.
'Barraclough v. Brown [1897] A. C. 6,5, 623. See also Magistrates of Rothe-
say v. The Officers of State (June 22, i82o, Scotland) Fac. Coll., quoted in
1(1849) 41 LAw MAGAZINF, 179.
"The question of "future" interests as the subject of a declaratory judginent
will be discussed in a separate section, post.
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them was sufficient to justify a declaration that the company was not
liable to pay certain illegal charges assessed by the dock company upon
the occupants of the docks in question. 60 A sufficient "interest" in
a negative declaration is involved in the danger of a criminal prosecu-
tion or the liability to a penalty ;"' or in the desire to stop the running
of the statute of limitations. 2
The declaration with respect to the genuineness or spuriousness of
a legal instrument, an institution adopted from the French law, goes
merely to the determination of its intrinsic genuineness. If its validity
or meaning depends upon proof of extrinsic facts, its interpretation
and construction will come under the head of disputed or uncertain
"legal relations." The declaration of its genuine or spurious character
is therefore of evidential value only, but it binds the parties and their
privies and has thus, as res judicata, an advantage over the proceeding
to perpetuate testimony.63  The action applies to any kind of legal
instrument capable of affording evidence of a private jural relation,
and the plaintiff must, as in all declaratory judgments, show his "inter-
est" in the declaration requested. The burden of proof Qf genuine-
ness or spuriousness may rest either on the plaintiff or on the
defendant, depending fipon presumptions created by the instrument
itself and upon the particular matter to be proved. The declaration
of genuineness or spuriousness of legal instruments is deemed to be
the only exception to the rule that the German courts will not make a
mere declaration of facts.64
Notwithstanding the wide scope for the declaratory action which
is opened by section 256 of the German code of civil procedure, it is
worthy of note that probably less than five per cent of the decisions
of the Supreme Court are merely declardtory. This may, in part, be
due to an early decision of the Supreme Court in 1881 which held that
a plaintiff could not in effect'take "two bites at the cherry'--if he had
available an executory action .(Leistungsklage) he could not first sue
for a declaration of his right (Feststellungsklage) and then bring
further actions for coercive relief. This would invite a multiplicity
of suits.6 This decision and a few others like it were so severely
criticized by Dr. Bifhr," one of the draftsmen of the code, as contrary
C'London Assn. of Shipowners etc. v. London & India Docks etc. (C. A.)
[1892] 3 Ch. 242.
" (1886) 16 R G, 39o; (1893) 31 R G, 30; (igog) 7o R G, 371 and ibid. 397.
See also Burghis v. Atty. Gen. [IgI] 2 Ch. 139; Dyson v. Atty. Gen. (C. A.)
[igii] i K. B. 410. China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. v. Maclay [1918] i
K. B. 33.
(1889) 23 R G, 346, 348; (igo5) 61 R G, 164, 168.
Petersen, op. cit. 497, 498; Seuffert, op. cit. 312, 313.
,Infra.
(1881) 4 R G, 437.
"Bihr, op. cit. I68-170.
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to the intent of the statute that the Supreme Court later reversed its
position. Experience has shown that after a right has been declared,
rarely, if ever, will an action to enforce compliance therewith be neces-
sary. Yet the practice appears to have been considerably influenced
by these early decisions; so that a declaratory action is rarely brought
if an executory action is available. Certain recent decisions, moreover,
while admitting that the requests for a declaration and for coercive
relief might be combined in one action, have taken the view that the
declaration must be directed to a different end than the executory
decree, and that a plaintiff should not request a declaratiop at all-
on the ground that he has no "legal interest" in it-if he might have
requested an executory judgment. This now has an additional reason,
for the amended code of 1898 provides a form of action for executory
judgments with respect to obligations to become due in the fufure,
such, for example, as periodically recurring payments of rent. While
such a judgment was formerly .eclaratory in its nature, requiring a
new action, if necessary, upon the former judgment to obtain exe-
cution on the due day, it is now an executory judgment on which a
writ of execution can immediately issue on the due day. 7 The result
is that for the most part the declaratory action in Germany is in
practice confined to demands for the enforcement of which an execu-
tory action has not yet accrued, and to actions for a negative declaration.
The interesting thing to note is that the only case in which under the
English Act of c852 a declaration could be made, namely, where it
might, if requested, have been followed by coercive relief, is the
particular case in which it could not be sued for in Germany.
Italy. Modern Italy appears to have abandoned the Middle Age
declaratory action, for Mattirolo informs us that the only kind of
judgment, apart from declarations of nullity, now rendered in Italy
are executory judgments.6 s
Spain and Spanish America. Modem Spain and variou§ countries
of Spanish-America have inherited through the Siete Partidas9 of
the Middle Ages, in the form of the action of jactancia (ja'ctitation),
the old Roman actioti of the lex Diffamari which enabled a prospective
legal defendant threatened with an action to appear as "equitable"
plaintiff with the demand that his opponent be compelled to bring his
threatened action or to keep silent. These provisions of the Siete
Partidas have been adopted almost literally in several Spanish-Ameri-
'These actions to safeguard "future" interests will be more fully discussed
infra.
68I Mattirolo, Trattato de Diritto Giudiziario Civile Itallano (4th ed.) 63.
For a short historical accotunt of the negative declaratory action, containing a
statement that it was expressly omitted from the Italian code with the exception
of the creditor's action ex lege si contendat, see I Enciclopedia Giuridica Italiana,
pt V, s. V ° , Azione, 1116-1117.
Ley 46, tit. II, part. 3a. See 3 Codigos Esparfoles, 30.
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can codes"0 and a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Spain71
affirms the modern survival of the old action of jactancia authorized
by Law 46 of the Partidas, and denies its implied repeal by art. 1976
of the Civil Code. As expressed in the Bolivian code, whence they
were directly taken by the codes of Uruguay and Argentina, these
provisions read:
"In case any person boasts or asserts against another matters
which cause the latter to lose good reputation or honor, the
offended person may require the boaster to bring an action or
to keep silence."
"When a person who must go on a journey by land or sea
asserts that another is awaiting the moment of his departure
to bring some action against him, he may ask that the latter
be compelled to bring his action.' (Art. 191.)
Professor'Gallinal of Uruguay, an authority on civil procedure, is of
the opinion that the action of jactancia has outlived its usefulness and
should be eliminated from the codes of Latin-America as it has already
been in Italy and other states.7 2 He suggests replacing it with.a gen-
eral action for a declaratio juris or declaratory judgment.7 3
Scotland. The connecting link between the declaratory action of
the Middle Ages and modern English law is to be found in the law
of Scotland. Just when the declaratory action was adopted in Scot-
land it is difficult to say. The modern works on Scotch practice dis-
close no statute or rule of court which expressly authorizes or
recognizes the so-called "action of declarator." Inferences as to its
origin in Scotland have been indulged. Lord Stair states7 ' that
"declarators of right proceeded of old by brieve of right which is now
out of use." A writer in the Law Magazine7 5 points out that the brieve
was replaced by the summons in 1532, when the Scotch Court of
Session was established. That court was approved by the Scotch
"°Bolivia, Code of civil procedure, arts. i89, i9r; 'Chile, arts. 258-262, 278;
Argentina (Buenos Aires, Capital), arts. 425-432; Uruguay, arts. 259, 26o,
863-872. Similar provisions are to be found in the codes of Panama, Costa Rica,
Mexico (Federal District) and of other states of Spanish-America.
"Decision of Sept. 27, 1912, Tribunal Supremo, no. 163 in (1912) 42 JuRis-
PRUDENCIA crI, n. s., io8g.
Rafael Gallinal, Estudios sobre el Codigo de Procedimiento Civil (Monte-
video, i9o7) 1o5 et seq.
' The Spanish nomenclature may easily mislead the casual reader in this
matter. The juicio ordinario declarativo is the usual form of action leading to
a judgment which may be executed. The juicio ejecutivo is the summary form
of action authorized in certain cases of indebtedness on a commercial instru-
ment, provisional execution beginning at once by the issue of a writ of attach-
ment against the debtor who has only a brief time, generally a few days, to
put in a defense and stay final execution.
74 Institutions of the Law of Scotland (More's ed. 1832) 4,.I.
"(1846) 41 LAw MAGAziN., I79.
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parliament in 1537 and Morrison's Dictionary discloses several cases
of "declarator," the earliest of which is dated July 16, 1541. 6 The
institution has had a history in Scotland, therefore, of nearly four
hundred years. As to its sources, it has been suggested that these
are to be fofind (i) in the brieve of right, which was worded like the
summons of declarator; (2) in the forms adopted by the old episcopal
courts for the administration of the ecclesiastical law, notably the
declarations of legitimacy, marriage, and other matters of status ;-
the form of their judgment ran "pronunciamus decernimus et declara-
mus"; and (3) in the forms of the French law, according to which
the Court of Session originally administered justice, and which prob-
ably contributed, by way of example, to the employment of the
declaratory action.
7 T
The declaratory action is defined by Scotch institutional writers
to be one "in which the right of the pursuer [plaintiff] is craved to
be declared, but nothing is claimed to be done by the defender
[defendant] ."78 Lord Stair informs us, further, that "such actions
may be pursued for instructing or clearing any kind of right relating
to liberty, dominion or obligation"; and that "there is no right but
is capable of declarator."
7 9
Among the numerous forms of declarator, which may be either
affirmative or negative, disclosed by the Scotch forms80 are declara-
tions of marriage and of nullity of marriage,81 of legitimacy, of
bastardy,82 of putting to silence, the common form of negative declara-
tory action, by which the defendant is by summons given a limited
time to bring forward his action or have a decree of perpetual silence
pronounced against him ;s3 of property interests of all kinds, including
title, easements and servitudes, liens and burdens on the land ;84 of
the so-called "non-entry duties" ;s5 of the so-called "expiry of the
7' Ibid. 179.
' (1849) 41 LAw MAGA=NF, i8o.
784 Stair, 3, 47; 4 Erskine, Principles of the' Law of Scotland (2oth ed.) i,
25, 46. See also Mackay, Manual of Practice in the Court of Session (Edin-
burgh, 1893) 175.
4 Stair, 3, 47; ibid., 39, 15.
See 4 Scots Style Book, s. V, Declarator.
'Fraser, Husband and Wife (2d ed.) 1238, 1244.
' The action to declare a child a bastard cannot be brought in English law.
Yool v. Ewing [19o4] Irish Ch. 434, 445.
This procedure is also well known in Roman-Dutch law as practiced in South
Africa. See Morice, English and Roman-Dutch Law (2d ed.) 377; Voet, Bk.
XLVII, tit. io; De Villiers, The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries
(Cape Town, I899) 143. 4 Nathan, Common Law of South Africa (Grahams-
town, i9o7) chap. XVIII. On the Scotch action of putting to silence, see
Fraser, op. cit. 1244.
x Bell, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland (7th ed. by McLaren) 785.
Declaration of the landlord's "right" of re-entry for failure to pay rent
or other dues. It is a technical action described in i Bell, op. cit. 22.
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legal" term of redemption;"" of the forfeiture of rights ;87 of property
in or right of succession to moveables; of trust, validity of trust-deed,
power to revoke a trust-deed, or that trust instruments are ultra vires;88
of partnership;89 of proving the tenor,90 and other miscellaneous
actions, including those rescissory actions which merely declare a deed
or other instrument null and void, without any declaration or judgment
against the defendant.91
The Scotch law recognizes three forms of the declaratory action:
(i) the pure declarator alone; (2) the declarator with prayer for
possessory or petitory relief ("conclusions") ; and (3) the "declara-
tory adjudication." The first is confined purely to the declaration of
jural relations. The law of Scotland, instead of making such declara-
tion optional, makes it in certain cases a condition precedent before an
action for coercive relief can follow. So in cases of statutory for-
feitures, proving the tenor of a lost instrument, foreclosing the equity
of redemption, relying on title based upon prescriptive possession,
seeking to show that facts and circumstances prove or disprove a
marriage or legitimacy where that conclusion is denied; partition of
heritable property among heirs; and in other cases, the request for a
declaration must precede the request for further relief.9 2 It is com-
mon practice, as in England, to combine the request for affirmative
relief with one for a declaration, and often where the former is
denied, the latter may still be granted. The commentators assert that
"wherever a right upon which an action is to be founded is not clear
as to its existence or extent, a declarator is proper, and sometimes
necessary, before an action can proceed to enforce the right."9 3 The
"declaratory adjudication" is a method of vesting a legal title in the
This is the action by which a creditor who holds security in the form of an
interest in land may ask the court to declare that, ten years having expired
since the due date of the debt, he is entitled to an irredeemable title to the
property, the debtor having allowed the ten years to expire during which he
had a legal power of redemption. The creditor calls on the debtor to exercise
his power of redemption, otherwise to have it judicially declared as foreclosed.
This is one of the cases in which the declarator is essential-not' merely
optional-to the acquisition of an irredeemable title by the creditor. See Ormis-
ton. v. Hill (18og, Scot.) Fac. Coll. 155 and I Bell, op. cit. 743.
' Mackay, Manual, op. cit. 79, 378. The declaration of the forfeiture of a
lease is known as a declaration of "irritancy." See case of Wylie v. Heritable
Securities Invest. Assn. (1871) 10 M. 253.
682 Bell, op. cit. 386, note 3.
9'2 Bell, op. cit. 562, and cases there cited.
'That is, proving the tenor of lost or destroyed instruments by which a jural
relation is required to be established. See Lord Lovat v. Fraser (1845) 8 D.
316; Erskine, op. cit. 542-544.
'Bell, Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (7th ed. by Watson)
291; Erskine, op. cit. 542.
"Mackay, op. cit. 78, 79, 374-379.
Bell, Principles, sec. 1995; Mackay, Manual, 378.
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person who has the beneficial interest.9 4 Strictly speaking, while a
declaration of title is of course made, the judgment here, as in some
of the cases mentioned above, is more than declaratory. It consti-
tutes the certification or vesting of a new jural relation, and is,
therefore, investitive in its nature, whereas the declaratory judg-
ment proper merely declares a jural relation which is already in
existence, the determination having retrospective force to the period
when the right or other jural relation commenced. There is, for
example, a sharp distinction between the declaration of the nullity
of a "marriage" which never really was a marriage at all, as was
contemplated by the negative jactitation proceeding in England, and
the declaration of the nullity of a marriage voidable at the option of
one of the parties. The former judgment is declaratory, the latter
investitive. Closer analysis of the numerous actions which in Scot-
land are called declaratory reveals that many of them fall within the
class of what we would call "investitive, and the conclusion cannot be
avoided that it is only in the unlimited scope given to the negative
declaratory action, in the willingness to declare facts and "future
interests,"'95 and in such special proceedings as the declaration of
bastardy that Scotch law affords greater opportunity than the English
law of the present day for the declaratory action.
As in other systems of law, the exercise of the power to render a
declaratory judgment is discretibnary with the court; the plaintiff
must show a substantial interest in the declaration; the jural relation
he asserts must be disputed;96 the declaration of rights, etc., to be
enjoyed in the future must serve some useful purpose in settling dis-
puted or doubtful legal relations, so that it will not be made if it
cannot constitute res judicata.9 7 Yet recent decisions show a greater
disposition to declare contingent rights by anticipation, provided
there is some one to oppose the declaration. 8 While the Scotch
courts like other courts affirm that they will not declare abstract propo-
sitions nor the meaning of statutes 9 unless_ directly affecting private
jural relations, 100 they are more readily disposed to declare mere facts,
when serving some useful purpose, than are the courts of Germany or
England. 0 1
'Dalziell v. Dalziell (1756) 16 M. 204; I Bell, Commentaries, 751.
Infra.
q"See Magistrates of Edinburgh v. Warrender (1863) I M. 887, by Lord
Neaves.
'Thus, where a declaration was asked of the power of a plaintiff under a
trust deed to give certain sums by will provided he had no issue, the declaration
was declined because it would not bind unborn children. Harvey v. Harvey's
Trustees (i86o) 22 D. 1310, 1326.
"Chaplin's Trustees v. Hoile (i8go) 28 Sc. L. Rep. 51; Falconer Stewart v.
Wilkies (1892) 29 Sc. L. Rep. 534.
"Todd v. Higginbotham, (1854) 16 D. 794.
'"Leith Police Commissioners v. Campbell (1866) 5 M. 247.
101 Infra. •
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England. England owes the advantages it enjoys under the declara-
tory action to the agitation of Lord Brougham, begun in 1828. In a
notable speech delivered on February 7 of that year in the House of
Commons on the state of the courts of common law,10 2 he pointed out
the great benefits enjoyed by Scotland in enabling persons who appre-
hend future litigation to proceed by way of a declaratory action to
have their rights determined, and he mentioned its particular applica-
tion to doubtful or disputed interests in property. He introduced
bills for the adoption of the practice in 1843, 1844, 1846, 1854 and again
in 1857, the last of which resulted in the Legitimacy Declaration
Act, 1858.103 He obtained a very considerable following, particularly
amofig the judges, and on numerous occasions in the House of Lords
successive chancellors, including Lord Thurlow, Lord Loughborough,
Lord Eldon and others among their successors, called attention to
the merits of the Scotch action of declarator. Speaking with reference
to the negative declaratory action where the plaintiff has no'affirmative
cause of action, a proceeding not possible in England until 1883, Lord
Brougham in 1846 in delivering his opinion in the House of Lords in
the case of Earl of Mansfield v. Stewart"'0 said:
"I cannot close my observations in this case without once more
expressing my great envy, as an English lawyer, of the Scotchjurisprudence, and of those who enjoy, under it, the security
and the various facilities and conveniences which they have from
that most beneficial and most admirably contrived form of pro-
ceeding called a declaratory action. Here, you must wait till
a party chooses to bring you into court; here, you must wait
till possibly your evidence is gone; here, you have no means
whatever, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, of obtaining
the great benefit of this proceeding."'10 5
Lord Brougham lived to see his proposed reform partially adopted in
an amendment to the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852, to which we
shall recur presently, and in the Legitimacy Declaration Act, 1858.
By that Act it was provided that any natural-born British subject, or
any person whose right to be deemed a natural-born subject depends
wholly or in part on the validity of a marriage, being domiciled in
England, may apply by petition to the Court for Matrimonial Causes
praying for a decree declaring that his marriage, was or is a valid
marriage; and the court is to have jurisdiction to hear and decide the
application, and to make its decree declaratory of the validity or
invalidity of the marriage. 08
10218 Hansard (2d ser., 1828) col 127, col. i79.
103 21 & 22 Vict. ch. 93.
1045 Bell, 139, 16o.
"The object of this suit was to obtain a declaration that the vendor could
convey a good title to Lord Mansfield, the vendee, who threatened to withhold
payment on the ground that the title was in doubt.
'A person not domiciled in: England cannot, therefore, obtain a declaration
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Mention has already been made of the Act of 1856107 which enabled
persons interested in questions cognizable in the Court of Chancery
to state special cases for the opinion of the court as to "the construc-
tion of any Act of parliament, will, deed, or other instrument in writ-
ing, or any article, clause, matter or thing therein contained, or as to
the title or evidence of title to any real or personal estate contracted
to be sold or otherwise dealt with"; and enabled the court
"to determine the questions raised therein or any of them, and
by decree to declare its opinion thereon, and so far as the case
shall admit of the same, upon the right involved therein, without
proceeding to administer any relief consequent upon such
declaration; and that every such declaration of the said Court
contained in any such decree shall have the same force and
effect as such declaration would have had . . if contained
in a decree made in a suit between the same parties instituted
by bill; Provided . . . that if the Court shall be of opinion
that the questions raised . . cannot properly be decided
upon such case, the said Court may refuse to decide the same."
As an incident to regular actions, the Court of Chancery had occa-
sionally made declarations, notably in the construction of wills and
trust settlements. This power was apparently vastly enlarged by the
Chancery Procedure Act, 1852, section 50, which provided that
"No suit . . . shall be open to objection on the ground that
a merely declaratory decree or order is souglt thereby, and
it shall be lawful for the Court to make binding declarations
of right without granting consequential relief."
Judicial construction, however, greatly narrowed these important
grants 6f power. Vice-Chancellor Wood in 1853 confined the authority
given by these Acts practically to cases "where it should appear to
be necessary for the administration of an estate or as incidental to
coercive relief" ;108 and Chancellor Turner in 1856 stated that section
50 did not extend the
"cases in which declarations of right may be made, but merely
enables the Court to declare rights without following up the
declaration by the directions which, under the old practice,
have been necessarily consequent upon them."10 9
And the section was further restricted by the traditional aversion of
the courts to making findings as to the enjoyment of rights in the
of the validity of his marriage, although it was celebrated in England. Countess
De Gasquet James v. Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, [1g4l P. 53, 70.
"' Supra, p. 7. An Act to Diminish the Delay and Expense of Proceedings
in the High Court of Chancery in England, 13 & 14 Vict. ch. 35, secs. 1, 14.
1 Garlick v. Lawson (1853) io Hare, App. XIV.
" Lady Langdale v. Briggs (1856) 8 De G. M. & G. 391, 427.
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future or as to those which depend upon a contingency.110 The power
was further narrowed by the construction that the courts could make a
declaration only as an incident to coercive relief or. where there was a
"right" to consequential relief for which the plaintiff had merely
chosen not to ask. Where there was no "right" to consequential
relief, no declaration would be made.""' As this proceeding arose
before the Judicature Acts, it is possible to comprehend that it may
have appeared to a court of equity as something of an anomaly to
make a declaration as to a legal right when not preliminary or inci-
dental to any equitable relief; and that it may have appeared inex-
pedient to determine a question concerning a jural relation which had
not actually arisen and might never arise. This view of the court's
power inevitably made it impossible to institute a proceeding for a
negative declaration by which a plaintiff who fears that the defendant
will bring an action against him can ask quia timet by way of antici-
patory defence, so to speak, for a declaration that the defendant has
no just claim against him.'1 2
But with the reforms instituted by the Judicature Act of 1873 the
ground was laid for the adoption of new rules of court. Order XXV,
rule 5, of the Supreme Court Rules of 1883118 now paves the way for
a wide application of the declaratory judgment. It provides:
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on the
ground that a merely declaratory judgment is sought thereby,
and the Court may make binding declarations of right whether
any consequential relief is or could be claimed, or not."
Although this language would seem to make it clear that the plaintiff
need no longer have a cause of action entitling him to affirmative
relief-the only purpose which appears to have been intended by the
insertion of the words "or not,"-it was nevertheless only in 1915114
that the Court of Appeal fully admitted that a plaintiff may ask the
court not only affirmatively to declare his right or power, but also
negatively to declare the no-right or disability of his opponent defend-
ant (i. e., the privilege or immunity of the plaintiff). As late as 19o6
the court had expressed the opinion that only a plaintiff who had
an affirmative cause of action could request a declaration. It is also
to be noted that the power to make declarations under Order XXV,
'Lady Langdale v. Briggs, supra; Bright v. Tyndall (1876) 4 Ch. D. 189,
I96.
m Rooke v. Lord Kensington (1856) 2 K. & J. 753, 76o.
'Jackson. v. Turnley (1853) I Drew, 617, 627; Rooke v. Lord Kensington,
sup ra.
u'7 Statutory Rules and Orders, 54.
" Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay (C. A.) [1915] 2 K. B. 536. The decision
was by two judges against one. See supra, p. 9.
" See North Eastern Marine Engineering Co. v. Leeds Forge Co. [igo6] i
Ch. 324; (C. A.) [19o6] 2 Ch. 498.
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rule 5, is most freely exercised in the Chancery Division, much less
frequently in the King's Bench Division, and not at all in the Probate
Division, to which it has been held not to apply.
116
Furthermore, the amended rules of 1893 have introduced Order
LIV, A :117
"In any Division of the High Court, any person claiming to
be interested under a deed, will, or other instrument, may apply
by originating summons for the determination of any question
of construction arising under the instrument, and for a declara-
tion of the rights of the persons interested."
The exercise of the power is expressly made discretionary. This is in
addition to the power long exercised by courts of equity in advising
and directing trustees in their powers, duties and responsibilities, and
the determination of any question arising in the administration of a
trust "affecting the rights or interests of the persons claiming to be
creditor, devisee, legatee, next of kin, or heir-at-law, or cestui que
trust" or affecting other matters."18
It will have been observed that Order LIV, A, covers the construc-
tion of wills, deeds, contracts and other written instruments; and the
reports of the Chancery Division indicate that' more than half the
declaratory judgments rendered arise in the construction of wills or
deeds of trust under this Order,'" The simplicity of the new pro-
cedure when contrasted with the old tedious and expensive litigation
which any dissatisfied member of a family could render necessary may
be envied by us. New Jersey appears to be the only state which has
directly profited by the English example in this respect,120 although
a few states permit bills to construe a will.
Since the "forms of action" have been abolished in England, and
a plaintiff needs now in his writ or pleadings merely to state the facts
on which he relies, the declaration of "rights" under Order XXV,
roDe Gasquet James v. Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin [1914] P. 53, 71.
- Statutory Rules and Orders (1893) 552.
" Order LV, 7 Statutory Rules and Orders Revised, 126.
"'The originating summons is exceedingly simple. It reads, after the
caption:
"Let B of - in the county of - within eight days after service
of this summons on him, inclusive of the day of such service, cause an appear-
ance to be entered for him to this summons, which is issued upon the application
of A of in the county of who claims to be [state the nature
of the claim] for the determination of the following questions: [State the
questions.]"
' The New Jersey Act respecting the Court of Chancery, Suppl., approved
March 30, 1915, Public Laws 1915, ch. ii6, p. i85, sec. 7, reads as follows:
"Subject to rules, any person claiming a right cognizable in a court of equity,
under a deed, will or other written instrument, may apply for the determination
thereof, in so far as the same affects such right, and for a declaration of the
rights of the persons interested." See Inr re Untgaro's Will (917, N. J. Ch.)
lO2 Atl. 244
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rule 5, and LIV, A, is obtainable without technicality and inex-
pensively. So successful in improving the administration of justice
has the declaratory action been that Order XXV has been adopted
verbatim in the codes of procedure or rules of court of Australia,
New Zealand, Queensland, Victoria and other Australian states ;121
of Ontario, British Columbia, Manitoba and other Canadian provinces;
and of India and Ceylon.
India. In India, where the declaratory action has been extensively
used, Act VIII of 1859, section 15, embodied the provisions of section
50 of the Chancery Act of 1852. This section was repealed by Chap-
ter VI of the Specific Relief Act of 1877 (Act I of 1877, section 42)
which, while making it unnecessary for the plaintiff to be entitled to
any coercive relief, hence admitting the negative declaratory action,
bars the courts from making declaratory decrees only in cases where
the plaintiff, being able to seek coercive relief, omits to request it.
This legislation, therefore, adopts the early- construction of the Ger-
man Supreme Court and the present German practice requiring a
plaintiff to seek his strongest remedy, and overlooks the advantages
which a friendly suit enjoys over a hostile litigation in determining
one's legal position. In his valuable commentary on the Specific Relief
Act, Collett mentions 22 as the prerequisites of the declaratory decree:
I. There must be a present existing interest, however distant the
actual enjoyment may be; 2. There must be some present danger or
detriment to be averted by the declaration; and 3. A man entitled to
sue for an executory decree cannot seek only a declaratory decree. 23
Section 283 of the civil procedure code of 1882 also enables a person
claiming an interest in property attached under an execution of judg-
ment to institute a suit to establish his interest in the property, which
suit acts as- a stay of execution. A similar proceeding is provided in
Ceylon.124
United States. While the declaratory judgment, eo nomine, has
"a In New South Wales they appear to have retained without change the form
of section 5o of the Chancery Act of 1852.
" Collett, The Law of Specific Relief in India (Calcutta, 1882) 224.
On the Indian practice in making declaratory decrees see i Stokes, Anglo-
Indian Codes (Oxford, 1892) 934; Broughton, Notes of Cases decided upon
points of Civil Procedure (Calcutta, 1884) 93; and Sarkar, The Civil Procedure
Code (Act XIV of 1882) secs. II, 283, and the cases there digested. Under the
proviso that the executory decree must be claimed if feasible, the court will not
deny the declaratory action unless "satisfied beyond all doubt" that the plaintiff
ought to seek "further relief and yet has not done so." Aisa Siddika v. Bidhu
Sekhar Banerjee (913) 17 CALcUTTA L. J. 675.
2-4I Pereira, Institutes of the Laws of Ceylon (Colombo, i9Ol) 339. Such a
proceeding in -the form of trial of title by sheriff's jury is fairly common in
the United States. The purpose, however, is to protect the sheriff. See Sellers
v. Thomas (igoo) 185 Ill. 384 and Puterbaugh, Common Law Pleading and
Practice (9th ed.) 1127.
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not yet been adopted in the United States, it is proper to observe that
many of our states have without formal recognition admitted its
efficacy in various departments of the law. A careful search for
instances of its application would probably disclose many cases. But
its employment is spasmodic and desultory. The few examples that
we shall cite will serve merely to show that our special necessities have
occasioned recourse to the declaratory judgment without conscious
adoption, and that its formal admission into our practice would be
merly an extension to a wider field of an institution whose efficacy
we have. already admitted and which is even more thoroughly attested
by a prolonged practice of over thirty-five years in England and of
many more years in other countries.
Among the few instances that we shall notice in the United States,
the majority indicate the adaptability of the declaratory judgment to
the construction of written instruments and to the determination of
conflicting titles to real property. Attention has already been called
to the New Jersey statute of 1915, based on the English Order LIV, A,
according to which the chancery court may construe any will, deed,
or other written instrument without giving further relief .
25 Illinois
and some other states also admit bills in chancery for the construction
of wills, notwithstanding that no trust or questions of trust or other
questions are involved therein.120
The declaratory judgment in substance, although not in name, has
proved particularly effective for the determination of disputed or
doubtful questions of title to realty. In England and some other
countries, since the abolition of real actions, this has become the
regular method of trying title. We have long been familiar with the
equitable action for the removal of a cloud from title; and this action,
so far as it does not demand the destruction of instruments or of other
obstructing clouds, but merely a declaration of the plaintiff's title,
is in effect a declaratory action. But the artificial restrictions with
which this equitable remedy is encumbered have led to the enactment
of statutes which remove many of these limitations; and some of them
permit not merely a person in possession but any claimant of an
equitable or a legal interest in the land (and in some states even in
personal property) to institute an action for the trial of the title.12
Thus, a recent Connecticut statute provides:
"An action may be brought by any person claiming ....
an interest in . . . . real or personal property ....
" Public Laws 1915, ch. 116, sec. 7, P. 185. In re Ungaro's Will (1917, N. J.
Ch.) 102 Atl. 244. In this section the declaratory judgment, as such, is
expressly recognized.
"28 Hurd's Illinois Statutes, 19xi, c. 22 (Chancery) sec. 50, p. 166. See Barton
v. Barton (1918, Ill.) 119 N. E. 320..
.. The statutes are cited in 6 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed.) sec.
735. See also Wehrman v. Conklin (1894) 155 U. S. 314, 15 Sup. Ct. 129.
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against any person who may claim. . . any interest
. .. . adverse to the plaintiff . . . for the purpose of
determining such adverse . . . '. interest . . . . and to
clear up all doubts and disputes, and to quiet and settle the title
to the same.11
28
Somewhat analogous to these actions are the proceedings by a
person in possession for the statutory period against a person claim-
ing under a record title to have the latter's claim declared void and
to confirm his own title.
1 29
Our law is also familiar with the action by which an equitable
claimant can obtain a judgment impressing a trust upon the legal title
in his favor,--i. e., a judgment declaring the plaintiff to be cestui, and
therefore entitled in equity to property to which another has legal
title;1 0 or a judgment declaring a supposed trust to be invalid.3 1
In fact, actions are frequent for the declaration of the nullity of instru-
ments or transactions, although such declarations are usually inci-
dental to further relief. ' 2  When brought by prospective legal
defendants to anticipate their defenses under void or voidable instru-
ments they are declaratory actions. In this category are actions by
insurance companies to declare the invalidity of policies obtaihed by
fraud, sometimes before any loss has occurred; or by those prospec-
tively liable under negotiable instruments. 3s On the whole, the courts
Pub. Acts, 1915, ch. I74, sec. i. See Ackerman v. Union & New Haven
Trust Co. (9,5) go Conn. 63, 96 At. 149; (917) 9, Conn. 5o0, 5o6, ioo At.
22, where the court, Case, J., was most reluctant in admitting the fact that this
statute was in effect analogous to the English Order XXV, rule 5. The case
involved the construction of a will. See also Deaver v. Napier. (19i8, Minn.)
166 N. W. 187; Cod v. Glos (i9o8) 232 Ill. I42, 83 N. E. 529--action by vendee
under a contract of sale against a third person claimant of title.
'See the cases cited in 6 Pomeroy, op. cit. sec. .730, n. 17. In many states
such actions cannot be brought. They cannot be brought in Canada. Miller v.
Robertson (9o4) 35 Can. Sup. Ct 80; Reaumi v. Cot6 (1916 A.D.) 35 Out L.
Rep. 303. Equitable actions to establish and confirm title in case of lost records
and under other circumstances are admitted in Wisconsin, Laws of 1878, ch.
252, Statutes, 1911, see. 661 h; and in Illinois, Hurd's Statutes, 1911, cl. 22,
p. 167.
'Donohoe v. Rogers (1914) 168 Cal.-7oo, 144 Pac. 958. See the interesting
case of Porten v. Petersen (1918, Minn.) 166 N. W. 183, where a vendee not
yet entitled to specific performance because all the installments of the purchase
price had not yet been paid, the defendant vendor having repudiated the contract
by refusing to receive further installments, nevertheless obtained a judgment
declaring his equitable title.
Scheibner v. Scheibner (1917, Mich.) 165 N. W. 66o.
z"See the case of Slingerland v. Slingerland (191o) 1O9 Minn. 407, 410, 411,
124 N. W. i9, where a woman sued for a declaration that a contract with her
husband for the release of her dower was void because obtained by fraud. The
action was held not premature.
... Commercial Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McLoon (1867, Mass.) 14 Allen,
351; Globe Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Reals (1879) 79 N. Y. 2o2; see also
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are reluctant to make such declarations, and only in exceptional cases
will they relieve the petitioner by anticipation .from the usual duty of
setting up his legal defenses when sued.134
By a Wisconsin'statute,
"when the validity of any marriage shall be denied or doubted
by either of the parties, the other party may commence an action
to affirm the marriage, and the judgment in such action shall
declare such marriage valid or annul the same and be con-
clusive upon all persons concerned."' 135
So far as this judgment declares the validity of a marriage, it is purely
declaratory, and its purpose the exact opposite of the old English
"jactitation" proceeding. So far as it declares the marriage null,
provided it was merely voidable and not void ab initio, it is not purely
declaratory but rather investitive, or, more accurately, divestitive in
its nature.
Other illustrations are to be found in statutes authorizing judg-
ments proving the tenor of lost instruments or proving the validity,
when contested, of instruments to be recorided.' 36 Judgments declaring
statutes unconstitutional are declaratory, though they are usually
accompanied by some specific relief, and the classic example of the
trustee's request for advice and directions under a trust instrument is
illustrative of this form of action. The examples given above will
suffice to show that the formal adoption of the declaratory judgment
in our practice, far from constituting a radical innovation in our legal
institutions, would merely serve to extend the application of remedies
already employed.
In part II of this article an analysis of numerous declaratory actions
and judgments will be undertaken with a view to determine the scope
of and the limitations upon this useful form of procedure.
(To be continued)
the English cases of Brooking v. Maudslay, Son & Field (1888) 38 Ch. D.
636, and Honour v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc. [I9oo] i Ch. 852, in which the
declarations were refused.
... These actions are in effect requesfs for negative declarations. An instance
of a prospective legal defendant instituting a proceeding to compel the prospective
plaintiff to sue is afforded by the unusual statute of New Mexico of March ii,
i9o3, ch. 23, sec. 2, which enables a corporation, anticipating a suit against it
by a person who has sustained a personal injury, to compel that person to file
his complaint. So, in prize law, the owner of a captured vessel or goods can
compel the captor to institute prize proceedings. The Zarnora (H. L.) [1916]
2 A. C. 77.
"Wisconsin Statutes, sec. 3252. See Kitzman v. Kitznan et al. (I918, Minn.)
166 N. W. 792.
e. g., California, Statute§ 19o5, p. 6o4; Civil Code, sec. 1203.
